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Abstract: This memorandum presents security mechanisms for router and
link admittance control in OLSRv2. Digitally signing OLSRv2 control messages
allows recipient routers to – individually – choose to admit or exclude the orig-
inating router for when populating link-state databases, calculating MPR sets
etc. By additionally embedding signatures for each advertised link, recipient
routers can also control admittance of each advertised link in the message, ren-
dering an OLSRv2 network resilient to both identity-spoofing and link-spoofing
attacks.
The flip-side of the coin when using such a link-admittance mechanism is,
that the number of signatures to include in each OLSRv2 control message is
a function of the number of links advertised. For HELLO messages, this is
essentially the number of neighbor routers, for TC messages, this is the number
of MPR Selectors of the originator of the message. Also, upon receipt of a
control message, these signatures are to be verified. This memorandum studies
the impact of adding a link-admittance control mechanism to OLSRv2, both in
terms of additional control-traffic overhead and additional in-router processing
resources, using a several cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA and Elliptic
Curve Cryptography for very short signatures.
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Router and Link Admittance Control in the
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version
2 (OLSRv2)
Re´sume´ : Ce me´morandum pre´sente un me´canisme de se´curite´ a` granularite´
fine dans OLSRv2. En embarquant dans les messages de controˆle dOLSRv2 une
signature pour chaque lien annonce´, les routeurs destinataires peuvent choisir
dadmettre ou d’exclure - individuellement - certains liens lors du remplissage de
la base de´tat des liens, lors du calcul des ensembles de MPR, etc. Ce me´canisme
de se´curite´ a` granularite´ fine peut ainsi eˆtre utilise´ pour rendre un re´seau OL-
SRv2 re´sistant a` la fois aux attaques par usurpation didentite´ et aux attaques
par pre´sentation de liens factices.
Le revers de la me´daille est que le nombre de signatures a` inclure dans chaque
message de controˆle OLSRv2 est fonction du nombre de liens annonce´s. Pour
les messages HELLO, c’est essentiellement le nombre de routeurs voisins, pour
les messages TC le nombre de se´lecteurs de MPR de l’expe´diteur du message.
De plus, les signatures doivent eˆtre ve´rifie´es lors de la re´ception du message
de controˆle. Ce me´morandum e´tudie limpacte de lajout de cette se´curite´ a`
granularite´ fine a` OLSRv2, tant en termes de couˆt supple´mentaire au niveau
des flux de controˆle, quen termes de traitements supple´mentaires au niveau du
routeur par lutilisation dun large e´ventail dalgorithmes cryptographiques allant
de HMAC a` RSA and passant par la cryptographie sur les courbes elliptiques
pour les signatures tre`s courtes.
Mots-cle´s : OLSRv2, MANET, Se´curite´ a` granularite´ fine, controˆle dacce`s,
signature nume´rique
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a b d
a: HELLO (b=MPR)
b: TC (b-a)
c
b: HELLO (c=MPR)
X
Figure 1: Basic OLSRv2 Operation
1 Introduction
Network integrity in routed networks is largely preserved by physically control-
ling access to the communications channel between routers: know thy peers,
trust thy peers — and be able to disconnect thy peers if they are not worthy
of the trust, e.g. if the topology they present does not match expectations, i.e.,
routing integrity is protected by admitting only trusted peers, assuming that
these, once admitted, are well behaving.
In a MANET (Mobile Ad hoc NETwork), often operated over wireless inter-
faces, this is less obvious: physical access to the media between routers is not
delimited by a cable, but is available to anyone within transmission range; the
network topology is time-varying, either due to router mobility or due to time-
varying characteristics of the channel – consequently, determining that a peer
does not present an “expected topology” and subsequently “disconnecting” it
is difficult. As such, MANETs do not introduce particularly new security issues
for routing protocols, but rather render existing security issues easier to ex-
ploit and, therefore, require re-examining counter-measures for routing protocol
resilience.
1.1 OLSRv2 Overview
The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
is a successor to the widely deployed OLSR [6] routing protocol for MANETs.
OLSRv2 retains the same basic algorithms as its predecessor, however offers var-
ious improvements, e.g. a modular and flexible architecture allowing extensions,
such as for security, to be developed as add-ons to the basic protocol. OLSRv2
contains three basic processes: Neighborhood Discovery, MPR Flooding and
Link State Advertisements. The basic operation of OLSRv2 is illustrated in
figure 1. Ignoring the gray router X, the different elements of OLSRv2, the
processes for Neighborhood Discovery, MPR Flooding, and Link State Adver-
tisement, are detailed in the below. This is followed by a description of the
flexible message format used by OLSRv2, as well as the inherent extensibility
specifically enabling extensions such as those developed in this memorandum .
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1.1.1 Neighborhood Discovery
The process, whereby each router discovers the routers which are in direct com-
munication range of itself (1-hop neighbors), and detects with which of these it
can establish bi-directional communication. Each router sends HELLOs, listing
the identifiers of all the routers from which it has recently received a HELLO, as
well as the “status” of the link (HEARD, verified bi-directional – called SYM).
A router a receiving a HELLO from a neighbor b in which b indicates to have
recently received a HELLO from a considers the link a-b to be bi-directional.
As b lists identifiers of all its neighbors in its HELLO, a learns the “neighbors
of its neighbors” (2-hop neighbors) through this process. HELLOs are sent
periodically, however certain events may trigger non-periodic HELLOs.
1.1.2 MPR Flooding
The process whereby each router is able to, efficiently, conduct network-wide
broadcasts. Each router designates, from among its bi-directional neighbors, a
subset (MPR set) such that a message transmitted by the router and relayed by
the MPR set is received by all its 2-hop neighbors (i.e., the MPR set “covers”
all 2-hop neighbors). MPR selection is encoded in outgoing HELLOs. The set
of routers having selected a given router as MPR is the MPR-selector-set of that
router. A study of the MPR flooding algorithm can be found in [7].
1.1.3 Link State Advertisement
The process whereby routers are determining which link state information to
advertise through the network. Each router must advertise links between itself
and its MPR-selector-set, in order to allow all routers to calculate shortest
paths. Such link state advertisements, carried in TC messages, are broadcast
through the network using the MPR Flooding process. As a router selects
MPRs only from among bi-directional neighbors, links advertised in TCs are
also bi-directional. TC messages are sent periodically, however certain events
may trigger non-periodic TCs. In order to be able to discriminate between fresh
and stale information, Link State Advertisements, emitted by a given router,
include a sequence number incremented each time that router changes the set
of links advertised.
1.1.4 Flexible Message Format
OLSRv2 employs the format specified in [2], for all protocol messages. This
format enables scope-limited message flooding by way of <hop-limit> and
<hop-count> message header fields, modified each time a message is forwarded.
The message body format enables compact (aggregated) address representation,
also of non-contiguous network addresses, by way of address blocks, and has the
ability to associate any number of arbitrary attributes to each such address, by
way of inclusion of Type-Length-Value objects (TLVs), referencing the address
to which they correspond. Such TLVs are denoted “Address Block TLVs”1. An
example of an attribute that may be associated with an address in OLSRv2, is
Link Status = SYM in HELLOs, to indicate that a link between the originator
1In order to avoid repetition of attributes, an Address Block TLV can reference a single, a
range or all addresses in a given address block, see [2] for details.
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of the message and the indicated address has been verified to be bi-directional.
Another example of such an attribute, associated by an OLSRv2 router to spe-
cific addresses in HELLO messages is an MPR TLV, indicating a router’s MPR
selection.
Furthermore, the message body can contain any number of arbitrary at-
tributes not specifically associated to any address, this also by way of inclusion
of TLVs. Such TLVs are denoted “Message TLVs”. An example of an attribute
that may be included in a message in OLSRv2, and which is not associated with
any address, is the sequence number included in TCs.
The TLV structure permits any given message to be parsed correctly by
allowing an implementation to “skip over” TLVs not recognized, thus enabling
extensions to be developed that embed information into existing OLSRv2 control
messages.
1.1.5 Inherent Protocol Extensibility
[4, 5] are conceived to enable protocol extensions to be developed for OLSRv2.
This is, in addition to the message format described above, accomplished by
allowing that subsequent to the usual control message (HELLO and TC) gener-
ation, outgoing messages can be handed off to a protocol extension for further
processing. Amongst other things, such an extension can insert addresses, Ad-
dress Block TLVs and Message TLVs. Moreover, upon receipt of a control
message, and prior to the usual processing according to that message type, in-
coming messages can be processed by a protocol extension – including processing
of information from that message (extension specific TLVs, for example), as well
as allowing a protocol extension to identify the received message as malformed,
and thus prohibit processing of that message by OLSRv2.
1.2 OLSRv2 Vulnerability Taxonomy
As link state protocol, OLSRv2 assumes that (i) each router can acquire and
maintain a topology map, accurately reflecting the effective network topology;
and (ii) that the network converges, i.e. that all routers in the network will have
sufficiently identical topology maps. Network connectivity can be disrupted by
causing either of these assumptions to not hold, specifically (a) routers may
be prevented from acquiring a topology map of the network; (b) routers may
acquire a topology map, which does not reflect the effective network topology;
and (c) two or more routers may acquire inconsistent topology maps.
In OLSRv2, this translates into that: (i) the links designated by HELLOs
to be advertised in TCs reflect actual links in the network; (ii) that the TCs
advertise these actual links; and (iii) that TCs are correctly relayed, i.e. that
the MPR flooding process operates correctly. [8] provides a detailed security
analysis of OLSRv2, observing how, and with which consequences, a disruptive
attack might be conducted against an OLSRv2 network. A common, and not
surprising, observation from [8] is, that identity spoofing and link spoofing, i.e.,
that a router in its control traffic either pretends to have the identity of another
router or pretends to have (non-existing) links to another router, are major
vectors for disruptive attacks on an OLSRv2 network.
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1.3 Problem Statement
Returning to figure 1, router a selects b as MPR in order to cover c. b, therefore,
advertises the link b-a in TCs, throughout the network. If a malicious router, X
(gray circle) is a neighbor of a and spoofs the identity of c (more generally, of
all neighbors of b), then a will not select b as MPR. This has as consequences
that (i) b will not advertise b-a; and (ii) the MPR flooding process is disrupted:
TCs transiting through a will not be relayed by b to reach the right-hand side
of the network. This is an illustration of the effect of identity spoofing.
A possible countermeasure to such an identity spoofing attack is for a pro-
tocol extension to admit only control messages originating from routers, whose
identity can be verified to not be spoofed, for processing by OLSRv2 – router
admittance control.
Router admittance control assumes a transitive trust relationship between
routers: d receiving a TC from b declaring a link b-a, and which d (by way
of a router admittance control protocol extension) is able to verify was indeed
sent from b, will have to trust that b is correctly behaving (i.e., has not been
compromised) and that b has properly verified the identity of a (the “other end
of the link”, advertised in the TCs received from b) as well as the properties
associated herewith. Router admittance control does not permit the recipient
of a TC to verify that the content of the TC is valid.
Still in figure 1, should b be malicious or compromised, but still in possession
of credentials to generate TCs which pass verification by a router admittance
protocol extension, it might in its TCs also advertise a fictitious link b-d. c
would receive this and, thus, transit traffic destined for d via b, rather than
through “to the right” to where d is located. This is an illustration of the effect
of link spoofing.
A possible countermeasure to such a link spoofing attack is for a protocol
extension to admit only links, where it can be verified by the recipient that both
ends have “signed off” for the existence of that link – link admittance control.
1.4 Memorandum Outline
The remainder of this memorandum is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
a basic router admittance control mechanism for OLSRv2. Section 3 introduces
a link admittance control mechanism, allowing per-link verification without as-
suming transitive trust, also for OLSRv2. Section 4 provides a specification
of the protocol extension, notably the TLVs and their content, necessary for
enabling router and link admittance control, and how the proposed extensions
integrate into the OLSRv2 protocol architecture. As the protocol extensions
proposed in this paper rely on cryptographic signatures, section 5 briefly dis-
cusses the applicability of shared and public key cryptographic systems for this
purpose, and section 6 discusses the use of timestamps in the protocol extensions
proposed. Section 7 studies the performance of the proposed security mecha-
nisms, with particular emphasis on (i) control traffic overhead incurred, and (ii)
additional in-router resource requirements, as a consequence of these security
mechanisms. This memorandum is concluded in section 8.
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2 Router Admittance Control
Router admittance control in OLSRv2 is enabled by [4, 5] by allowing a protocol
extension to, upon receipt of a control message and prior to the usual process-
ing hereof, determine if the message originates from a router using a “spoofed
identity”. Thus, each router must be able to include sufficient credentials in
each control message to allow a recipient to make such a determination.
To this end, this paper assumes that (i) each router identity (IP address) is
also associated with a cryptographic key, (ii) this key is used for generating and
including a cryptographic signature in each outgoing control message, and (iii)
that this signature is verified by a receiving router, prior to the control message
being processed by OLSRv2. The cryptographic signature is carried in control
messages by way of a TLV, specified in section 4.
More precisely, for router admittance control, each router will, for each out-
going control message:
• calculate sign(ownID, TimeStamp, <msg>);
where <msg> is the control message, including all headers, but with the
mutable fields <hop-limit> and <hop-count> (if present) set to zero, and
TimeStamp is current at the time of signature generation;
• add this signature, as well as TimeStamp, by way of a Signature-TLV and
Timestamp-TLV (section 4), to the control message.
Each router will, for each incoming control message and prior to it being
delivered to OLSRv2 for processing:
• verify the included Signature-TLV;
• consider the message as malformed (and, thus, prohibit its processing by
OLSRv2) if either of:
– no Signature-TLV is present in the received message;
– the verification fails, i.e. the signature does not correspond to the
message originator and content;
– if clocks are synchronized and Replay Attacks are of concern, the
included TimeStamp is “too old” (refer also to section 6).
• otherwise, consider the message as correctly formed according to the Router
Admittance Control protocol extension.
If a message is so considered “correctly formed”, it implies that the originator
of the message either is not “spoofing” its identity – or, that the originator
has managed to acquire the credentials, necessary for generating a signature
corresponding to a spoofed identity.
3 Fine-Grained Security:
Link Admittance Control
In order to allow a router receiving a control message to verify “both sides” of
the link, (i) both sides must be able to establish that the link exists, and (ii)
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information “signing off” for this must be included in the control message. The
TLV format in [2] enables that that information can be associated with each
address, advertised in a control message.
For each address (the other end of the link) advertised in a control mes-
sage, the originating router includes a signature embedding its own address,
the address of the peer, the timestamp of emission, and any additional at-
tributes that the originating router has associated with that link, by way of
TLV inclusion, e.g., if the link is HEARD or SYM (for HELLO messages) or if
an address is routable (for TC messages). The signature so included is, thus:
sign(t, ownID, peerID, own-attribute-list). The router also signs the
message as described in section 2, thus notably including its own timestamp in
the message as well. Additionally, the router includes the most recent signature
previously received for this link from the peer, the corresponding timestamp re-
ceived from the peer, as well as the attribute list for this link received from the
peer (i.e., the information which the peer used for calculating the signature).
A router receiving such a message can, then, verify if (i) the two routers agree
on the attributes associated with the link, and (ii) do so at approximately the
same time2.
Consider the example depicted in figure 2.
router a router b
b: HELLO: 
a= HEARD;
 sign(t
1
, b, a, HEARD); 
t
0
t
1
t
2
time
a: HELLO: 
b: HELLO: 
a= SYM;
 sign(t
2
, a, b, SYM);
 timestamp
a
 = t
2
;
 atribute list
a
 = SYM;
 sign(t
3
, b, a, SYM); 
t
3
a: HELLO: 
b= SYM;
 sign(t
1
, b, a, HEARD);
 timestamp
b
 = t
1
;
 atribute list
b
 = HEARD;
 sign(t
2
, a, b, SYM);
 
t
0
t
2
t
1
t
3
Figure 2: Example of link admittance control in the Neighborhood Discovery
process of OLSRv2: attributes listed in “boxes” are those received from the
“peer” in a previous HELLO message.
At t0, a sends a HELLO; it has no neighbors and thus the HELLO is empty.
When b receives this HELLO, it will – as usual in OLSRv2 – advertise a as
HEARD in its next HELLO, at t1 and associate its signature sign(t1, b,
a, HEARD) to this advertisement, by way of a TLV. Any router receiving this
HELLO can verify only that b claims information about the link a-b.
At t2, a will proceed in a similar fashion, advertising b as SYM, associat-
ing its own signature sign(t2, a, b, SYM). The router will also include the
information shown inside the “box”: the last received signature for this link,
received from b, sign(t1, b, a, HEARD), and the information necessary for a
2Timestamps are included to counter replay attacks. Using timestamps requires roughly
synchronized system clocks. A similar mechanism using nonces could be possible, when clocks
are not assumed to be synchronized.
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third-party to be able to verify the signature of b: the timestamp t1, and the at-
tribute list corresponding to this link as received from b (HEARD). Any router
receiving this HELLO can by verifying the signatures observe that a and b at
this point have claimed different information about a (a describes the link as
SYM, b describes it as HEARD).
At t3, b may consider advertising a as SYM, and associating its own signa-
ture sign(t3, b, a, SYM). The router will also include the information shown
inside the “box”: the last received signature for this link, received from a,
sign(t2, a, b, SYM) and the information necessary for a third-party to be
able to verify the signature of a: the timestamp t2, and the attribute list cor-
responding to this link as received from a (SYM). Any router receiving this
HELLO can by verifying the signatures observe that at t2 and t3, respectively,
both a and b have claimed claimed that the link a-b is symmetric. If t2 and t3 are
sufficiently close, a recipient may conclude that a symmetric link exists between
a-b, and that both a and b have “signed off” herefore. The link can therefore
be considered as “trusted”, and thus reflected in the link- and neighbor-sets of
OLSRv2.
The main impact, in terms of protocol operation, is that if link admittance
control is used when admitting routers to the 2-hop set, then one further HELLO
message exchange is required in order for a router to be able to detect 2-hop
links as “signed off” as symmetric by both ends.
4 Protocol Extension Specification:
Router and Link Admittance Control
In the following, the router and link admittance control protocol extension,
proposed by this paper, is specified, in particular the TLV types introduced, as
well as the interaction between this protocol extension and OLSRv2.
4.1 TLV Specification
Three TLVs are required: a timestamp TLV, a signature TLV and an attributes
TLV. The timestamp TLV and the signature TLV, both, can be used as Message
TLVs (i.e. included in the header of a control message) and as Address Block
TLVs (i.e. associated with one or more addresses in the message body). This
section specifies the content of <value> TLVs, for use in the format described
in [2].
4.1.1 Timestamp TLV
<timestamp> := <time-value>
where: <time-value> contains the timestamp. A timestamp is essentially
“freshness information”, and may e.g. correspond to a UNIX-timestamp, GPS
timestamp or a simple sequence number. For the performance study of sec-
tion 7, the timestamp is a four-byte long integer, counting the seconds from the
start of the simulation.
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4.1.2 Signature TLV
<sign-tlv> := <hash-fkt><sign_algo><sign>
where: <hash-fkt> and <sign_algo> are 1-octet long fields identifying the
choice of hash function and signature algorithm, respectively, and <sign> con-
tains the digital signature.
4.1.3 Attributes TLV
<attributes> := {<attribute-value>}*
Recalling that for each address included in a message, two signatures are
ultimately included. If the message is originated by router a and contains an
address of a peer b, then for the link a-b a signature generated by both a and b is
included. In order for a third-party c to be able to verify also the signature from
the peer b, the exact information over which the peer b calculated this signature
needs to be available to c. In figure 2 at t2, for example, this information is
included in the box: the timestamp (t1) and the attribute list (HEARD). This
information has been received by a by way of TLVs, and the signature (sign(t1,
b, a, HEARD)) can be verified by a using the identities of both routers a and
b as well as the timestamp (t1) from the Timestamp TLV and the attribute
(HEARD) from the Attributes TLV.
4.2 OLSRv2 Interaction
Due to the flexible nature of the specification of OLSRv2, the router and link
admittance control extension, presented in this paper, can be designed as an
independent module. This module is invoked when an incoming control mes-
sage has been successfully parsed, and before further processing by OLSRv2,
as well as whenever an outgoing message is about to be sent. This simple ar-
chitecture allows combination of other OLSRv2 extensions with this router and
link admittance control extension, without encumbering such other extensions.
The flow of incoming and outgoing messages between the different modules is
depicted in figure 3.
5 Cryptographic Keys
Using cryptographic signatures in control messages allows the recipient of a
message to (i) verify the integrity upon receipt, (ii) verify if the originator is to be
admitted to the network, and (iii) verify the identity of originator of the control
message. For (i) and (ii), a “pre-shared secret”, such as a secret passphrase or a
symmetric key, suffices: only routers possessing the secret are able to correctly
sign control messages and addresses within, which allows exclusion of “all but
pre-approved routers”. However, (iii) requires asymmetric keys for allowing per-
principal authentication. As the link admittance control extension, presented in
this memorandum , relies on bi-directional verification of links between routers,
per-principal authentication is a requirement.
INRIA
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been parsed
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message has 
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Figure 3: Message flow between NHDP, OLSRv2 and the security extension
For assuring the reliability of the admittance control system, it is paramount
that the cryptographic keys are only accessible by the router that they are al-
located to. Furthermore, it has to be ensured that the keys cannot be derived
from any information exchanged between the routers, i.e., that the crypto-
graphic algorithm are not vulnerable to attacks, other than brute-force with
sufficient efforts for such a brute-force attack being appropriate for deployment
requirements.
6 Timestamps
The router and link admittance control extension can provide protection against
identity-spoofing and link-spoofing of unadmitted routers (i.e. routers not able
to correctly sign messages), but malicious routers can still record and replay
messages (see [8] for details on such “replay attacks”). These replay attacks can
be partly avoided by introducing “freshness” information, such as timestamps or
nonces, in messages. A message which is replayed some time after the recording,
can be detected as being “old” (at least, when the clocks of the routers are
roughly synchronized).
In this protocol extension proposed in this paper, both whole messages and
individual links are candidates for ”being replayed”. Consider a router X which
has been compromised (i.e., the attacker has access to appropriate credentials
to generate correctly signed messages). If no timestamps were included in the
per-link signatures, X could record such per-link signatures and include them
later in its messages, spoofing links to non-existing neighbors.
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7 Performance Study
This section presents a performance study, by way of simulations with NS2 [9],
of the link admittance control mechanism, in comparison to a simple router
admittance control mechanism, both in terms of message overhead and CPU
time. Simulations have been conducted with JOLSRv2 [10] using relatively
standard scenario parameters (1km2 square, 0-300m segments of random walk
at 2-8m
s
, and 0-5s pause-time). The number of routers was varied between
10 and 50, and each value has been averaged over 20 simulation runs. The
performance parameters studied are the extra control traffic overhead and the
in-router message generation/processing overhead incurred by the mechanisms
presented in this memorandum . JOLSRv2 uses AgentJ [11] for interfacing
with NS2. AgentJ/NS2 permits single thread execution, without preemption,
allowing instrumenting the signature generation and verification code to record
the time spent on each such operation3. For the simulations, an Intel Core 2
CPU with 2.1 GHz and 4 GB of RAM was used.
7.1 Overhead of Link Admittance Control
Using router admittance control, described in section 2, only a single signature
is included per control message. Using link admittance control, described in
section 3, up to two signatures are included per advertised address. Thus the
message size will grow with the density of the network, as depicted in figure 4
using RSA [12], DSA [13], ECDSA [14], and HMAC-80 [15]4. For RSA, DSA
and HMAC, the implementations directly provided by Java 6 have been used,
whereas ECDSA is a custom implementation.
In the following, only ECDSA and RSA are considered for the comparison,
exploring their differences in terms of (i) message overhead and (ii) CPU time
for processing and generating signatures.
Figure 5 depicts the cumulative overhead in the network, due to inclusion of
message signatures and address signatures. In this figure, as well as in the follow-
ing, the overhead only considers the size of the signatures, and not the content
of the HELLO or TC message themselves. Thus, for an unsigned message, the
overhead would be 0. For the router admittance control mechanism (denoted
“RA“), the per-message overhead is constant, and the cumulative overhead is a
function of the number of control messages – itself a function of simulation time
and number of routers. Note that the length of the control message does not
influence the length of the signature, since the signature is always calculated
over an SHA1 hash of the message. With link admittance control (denoted
“LA”), the total overhead grows polynomial with increased number of routers
and increased density in the network, as up to two signatures are added per
advertised neighbor in a control message. As RSA-1024 signatures are longer
than the corresponding ECDSA-160 signatures, the total overhead with RSA
grows considerably faster.
3For completeness: AgentJ rewrites System.currentTimeMillis() such as to return the
“simulator time”, whereas System.nanoTime() is not rewritten and therefore returns the “wall
clock time”.
4Note that HMAC, strictly speaking, is not a signature algorithm, but a Message Authen-
tication Code, see section 5.
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Figure 5: Total overhead incurring due to signature inclusion.
Using smaller signatures (e.g., as provided by ECDSA) is, in terms of mes-
sage size, particularly beneficial for link admittance control. Longer signatures
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(such as RSA) leads to (i) higher bandwidth consumption for control traffic,
and therefore (ii) higher energy consumption5, as well as (iii) the possibility
that the IP packet gets fragmented when its size is greater than the MTU of
the underlying link layer. This can be well observed in figure 4; assuming an
MTU of 1500 bytes (e.g. for Ethernet), messages signed with RSA would be
fragmented (with the associated risk of any one fragment being lost causing the
whole message to be lost) with about five neighbors, whereas ECDSA would
allow roughly three times more neighbors.
7.2 In-Router Resource Requirements
This section analyses the CPU time for creating and parsing signatures in con-
trol messages in OLSRv2 using the router admittance and the link admittance
control mechanisms respectively.
Figure 6 depicts the cumulative time each router spends, over the duration
of 100 seconds, on generating signatures in JOLSRv2, with router admittance
(denoted “RA”) and link admittance (denoted “LA”), both. For router ad-
mittance control, the time each router spends in total on generating signatures
is constant, since every router periodically creates HELLO and TC messages,
independently of the size of the network. As expected, using link admittance
control significantly increases the amount of CPU time required for generating
control messages, since the number of signatures per message to be generated
increases with the density of the network. ECDSA and RSA have similar time
consumption for generating signatures.
The corresponding cumulative processing time in each router is depicted in
figure 7. Each router generates HELLOs, which must be processed, and so
its signatures verified, by its neighbors. Thus, increasing the network density
increases the number of HELLOs that a given router receives and, therefore,
the number of signatures to verify. Depending on the network topology and
MPR selection, additional routers may also incur additional TCs, whose pro-
cessing and signature verification is to be conducted by each other router in the
network. Link admittance control significantly increases the amount of CPU
time spent for verifying signatures for control messages. RSA signatures are
very fast to verify, while verifying ECDSA signatures consumes a considerable
amount of CPU time. Since every signature has to be verified before it can be
forwarded, the total amount of time spent in each router for verifying signatures
is considerably higher than for generating messages.
8 Conclusion
When OLSRv2 routers use digitally signed control messages for admittance con-
trol, these routers can verify the identity of control message originators and the
integrity of the messages. However, a router has to trust the message originator
that the advertised links in the HELLO or TC message are valid. This mem-
orandum specifies a router and link admittance control protocol extension to
5[16] states “The energy cost of transmitting 1Kb a distance of 100 meters is approximately
3 joules. By contrast, a general-purpose processor with 100MIPS/W power could efficiency
execute 3 million instructions for the same amount of energy”, indicating that shorter (but
more computationally intensive) signatures for certain applications, such as energy constrained
devices, may be preferential.
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OLSRv2 , which allows a router to verify each advertised link from incoming
control messages, by signing “both ends of the link“. The router and link admit-
tance control protocol extension is generic, in that it is not tied to any specific
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cryptographic system. Indeed, the mechanism operates as long as the choice
of cryptographic system allows for per-principal authentication and signature
generation
A performance study of this extension is presented, quantifying the impact in
terms of increased control traffic overhead and increased per-message generation
and processing time, exemplified by using two relatively common cryptographic
systems: RSA, for its performance in verification of signatures, and ECDSA for
its short signature lengths for the same ”strength” of signatures. It is argued
that using shorter signatures may be advantageous when using such a router and
link admittance security mechanism, since the additional overhead grows linear
with the density of the network. Using longer signatures leads to (i) higher
bandwidth consumption for control traffic, and therefore (ii) higher energy con-
sumption, as well as (iii) the possibility that the IP packet gets fragmented when
its size is greater than the MTU of the underlying link layer.
It is observed, however, that regardless of the choice of cryptographic system,
these router and link admittance control protocol extension is no ”free lunch”:
other than the size increase in control messages, the time required for signature
generation and verification is – unsurprisingly – not negligible.
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